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Introduction
Project Mercury was the United States' first
program directed toward the development of a capa-
bility for manned space flight. The initial goal
of this project was to place an astronaut into orbit
and recover him safely. This objective was satis-
fied by the successful flight of Astronaut John H.
Glenn, Jr., on February 20, 1962, approximately
3 years after the award of the prime spacecraft
contract. The similar mission of Astronaut
Carpenter some 3 months later served to confirm the
results of Glenn's mission. The final two manned
flights in Project Mercury were conducted to extend
the knowledge of man's reactions and capabilities
in space for a longer time period. Astronaut
Shirra's flight in October of 1962 lengthened the
period of observation from W hours to 9 hours, and
the final Mercury mission, that of Astronaut L.
Gordon Cooper, Jr. , in May of 1963, extended the
flight duration to some J>k hours. Each of these
missions was successful, but, as the present paper
concludes, this success was largely dependent upon
the manual control capability of the pilot. A mile-
stone chart which indicates the flight dates for the
Mercury orbital missions is shown in table I.
When the Mercury spacecraft was conceived,
little was known about man's capability to function
in space; therefore, most of the critical systems
were designed to operate in essentially an automatic
mode. However, in order to make a conclusive eval-
uation of the pilot's ability to exercise manual
control in the space environment, many of the auto-
matic systems incorporated a manual override capa-
bility. During each of the Mercury orbital flights,
malfunctions occurred in various systems which could
have compromised the initial mission objectives. In
the discussion of the unmanned orbital flights, an
evaluation of these malfunctions is presented with
regard to the mission consequences if a pilot had
been able to provide manual override. This evalua-
tion is considerate of the pilot's capabilities
demonstrated during the manned flights. The crit-
ical system failures which occurred during the
manned orbital flights are examined with regard to
the pilot's response and effectiveness in coping
with the hazardous situations. Prior to this dis-
cussion, however, a brief description of the space-
craft systems and the philosophy which governed the
associated manual operating modes are presented.
The discussion of the systems malfunctions is then
arranged in a chronological manner according to the
orbital mission analyzed. The Mercury suborbital
flights are not discussed since the nature of the
trajectory involved and the brief flight times tend-
ed to minimize the consequences of any inflight
systems malfunction. Although the Mercury-Atlas 3
(MA-3) mission was intended to be a three-pass
orbital flight, a failure of the launch vehicle
resulted in an abort.
Systems Description
The Mercury spacecraft was designed to provide
a safe and habitable environment while in orbit as
well as protection during the critical flight phases
of launch and reentry. In the later missions, par-
ticularly, the spacecraft also served as an orbiting
laboratory where the pilot could conduct limited
experiments to increase knowledge in the space sci-
ences. The many systems which the spacecraft com-
prised may be generally grouped into those of heat
protection, mechanical and pyrotechnic, attitude
control, communications, electrical and sequential,
life support, and instrumentation. The arrangement
of these systems within the spacecraft is illustrat-
ed by the simplified schematic diagram in figure 1.
The spacecraft attitude control system is described
in the greatest detail since this system represented
the greatest source of trouble during the orbital
flight program. Malfunctions occurred, however, in
the life support and electrical and sequential
systems which required action by the astronaut, and
these systems are also briefly described. The re-
maining systems functioned properly and therefore
have no bearing on the present discussion, but a
cursory description of these systems may be found
in references 1 to k.
Spacecraft Control System
The spacecraft control system provided for
attitude control and rate stabilization of the
spacecraft during the orbital and reentry portions
of flight. In addition to the system electronics,
the control system was composed of two independent
reaction control systems (RCS), as shown in figure 2,
one of which supplied fuel for the automatic sta-
bilization and control system (ASCS) and fly-by-wire
(FBW) modes and the other, until the final mission,
supplied the manual proportional (MP) and the rate
stabilization and control system (RSCS) modes. The
RSCS was installed in the spacecraft used for the
second manned suborbital mission and subsequent
spacecraft as a backup to auxiliary damping, one of
the secondary modes of the ASCS. The RSCS unit was
removed for the final flight because of its high
fuel-consumption characteristics and weight. In
addition to the auxiliary damping mode, the ASCS had
three other secondary modes (see table II) select-
able by the pilot, those of orientation, orbit, and
reentry. The auxiliary damping mode was used to
maintain a fixed roll rate, while damping rates
about the other two axes. The remaining three modes
were employed to keep the vehicle at a fixed atti-
tude, with the orbit and orientation modes used dur-
ing the orbital phase, and the reentry mode used to
position the spacecraft for reentry. The RCS em-
ployed hydrogen peroxide as the fuel and a silver
catalyst to decompose the H_0p and produce thrust
through variously sized thrust chambers, or thrust-
ers. The peroxide fuel was supplied to the thrust-
ers by a nitrogen pressurization system; and the
two RCS's were independent in that they comprised
separate fuel, pressurization, and thrust chamber
assemblies. Fuel was metered to the thrusters by
..
small solenoid valves, or, in the case of the MP,
by proportional valves controlled through a direct
mechanical linkage. Both direct-current (d-c) and
alternating-current (a-c) power were used by the
amplifier-calibrator, or Amp-Cal, which provided
the logic for the automatic control circuitry and
controlled the various ASCS operating modes. For
example, the Amp-Cal regulated and received signals
from the attitude gyros, which drove the pilot's
attitude indicators. Figure 3 indicates the slav-
ing cycle used to maintain the accuracy of these
gyros. The horizon scanners, one each for the
pitch and roll axes, sensed vehicle attitude with
respect to the earth horizon, and, if a comparison
with the gyro output produced a disagreement, the
drifted gyro was repositioned by the slaving cir-
cuit. The Amp-Cal processed this information in
acting upon a given attitude command and operating
the proper RCS thrusters. A thrust impulse, of
course, produced an attitude change which was de-
tected in the scanner and gyro sensing mechanisms,
thereby producing the closed-loop function. Of the
two manual modes available to the pilot, one was
electrically connected to one RCS, and the re-
maining mode used a mechanical linkage to the other
RCS. The control mode arrangement had the capabil-
ity of providing mechanical mode control in the
event of a power failure. Although the thrust
units were designed to provide an impulse suffi-
cient for all normal spacecraft maneuvers, these
redundant manual control modes could be used
simultaneously, if desired, in critical situations,
such as retrofire and reentry where rapid response
to undesirable attitude rates might become neces-
sary. The astronaut initiated manual attitude
commands through a three-axis hand controller shown
in figure k. This controller was designed such ,
that singular or coordinated control inputs could
be accomplished with the use of the right hand only
and without essential movement of the arm. This
feature was particularly important during reentry
where either high acceleration forces retarded arm
motion or other activities required one hand to be
free for switching functions.
Sequential System
As stated previously, the Mercury spacecraft
was initially designed to be flown solely in an
automatic mode; therefore, a sequential system had
to be devised which would initiate and control
critical flight events, such as separation from
the launch vehicle, retrofire, and reentry. Most
flight events had to occur in the proper sequence
and were sometimes separated by only milliseconds
of time. It is not intended here to describe the
mechanics of the sequential system, but rather to
present briefly the operating philosophy and its
manual override implications. This system con-
sisted of cascaded electrical elements, such as
time-delay and zero-delay relays, positional limit
switches, inertially actuated switches, pressure-
sensing units, and timing devices. These elements
controlled events which were dependent upon the
elapsed time of the flight, spacecraft attitude
and position, the vehicle environment, and the
status of spacecraft systems. Redundant sources
of power and electrical paths were provided to
increase reliability. Manually initiated backup
and override modes were provided for all major
events. These manual controls permitted the pilot
to initiate a sequence when the automatic system
had failed or to pre-empt the automatic system when
the consequences of the normal event might be
catastrophic, such as jettisoning the retrorockets
prior to their ignition. A mission abort could
have been initiated automatically, as well as by
ground command, during the launch phase, and by the
astronaut during all flight periods. Most of the
manual control of flight sequences was accomplished
through a series of switch fuses on a panel of
sequence lights with associated push buttons that
could have initiated major flight events. If these
lights did not indicate the function had been in-
itiated at the proper time, the astronaut was able
to respond immediately. Many of the events during
powered flight were related to launch-vehicle func-
tions and are not discussed herein. The sequence
of events for the retrograde and reentry phases are
pertinent to a later discussion and are shown in
figure 5.
Life Support System
The life support system consisted primarily of
the environmental control system (ECS), but also
included the astronaut's drinking water and food
supplies, personal survival equipment, and the
support couch and restraint system. A more com-
plete description of the life support system may
be found in reference 5- The ECS comprised two
separate environmental circuits, one for the astro-
naut's pressure suit and one for the spacecraft
cabin. A schematic diagram of the ECS is presented
in figure 6. The ECS controlled the pressure and
temperature of the cabin and suit environments and
supplied breathing oxygen for the astronaut. Tem-
perature was controlled through an evaporative-type
heat exchanger in each of the two circuits. Dis-
tilled water was used as the coolant. The evapor-
ated water, or steam, was exhausted into space.
The only item common to both circuits was the single
cooling water supply, which incorporated a positive -
expulsion bladder system. The warm air from the
cabin and the suit circuits was forced through the
heat exchangers by separate fans. Two devices
were used to extract condensed water from the suit
circuit gas stream. Water was removed from the
suit circuit by a water separator, and, for the
final flight, an inline water trap, and was stored
in a condensate tank. In the suit circuit, a
solids trap was used to remove particulate matter,
and a lithium-hydroxide canister was employed to
remove carbon dioxide. One-hundred percent oxygen
,was supplied from two pressurized bottles, and a
means existed to permit direct flow of this oxygen
into the suit circuit without passing through the
(heat exchanger. This capability provided immediate
icooling in the event of an ECS failure, or a pure
breathing atmosphere if the suit circuit air became
toxic. The two environmental circuits were inde-
pendent for reliability reasons, particularly in
the instance of a rapid decompression of the space-
craft cabin. Manual metering valves were placed on
the astronaut's instrument console to permit ad-
justment of the coolant flow in both ECS circuits
and thereby control temperature.
Electrical System
The electrical power system in the Mercury
spacecraft consisted of three main, one isolated,
and two standby batteries, which provided d-c
power directly and a-c power through one standby
and two main inverters. These batteries and in-
verters were linked to a series of electrical
power buses from which all systems derived their
operating power. These power sources could be
switched selectively by the astronaut should one or
more fail in flight. The astronaut had a visual
indication of power-system status from d-c and a-c
voltmeters and a d-c ammeter installed on the
instrument panel. Since the ammeter is necessarily
connected in the line, or in series, and an open-
circuit failure of this unit could interrupt avail-
able power, a bypass switch was incorporated to
permit rerouting the circuit around a failed instru-
ment. As shown in figure 7, the primary electrical
power buses supplied power to the ASCS portion of
the control system, the ECS fans, and the various
communications systems. For a-c power, a special
control circuit regulated current flow through a
series of relays, which were controlled by both
automatically and manually operated selector
switches. Batteries and inverters were redundant
to provide a high reliability within their intended
operating life.
Unmanned Orbital Missions
Mercury-Atlas Mission k (MA-4)
The MA-U mission was a second attempt, after
the failure during powered flight of MA-3, to place
an unmanned spacecraft into orbit carrying a device
which simulated the metabolic conditions imposed by
the pilot. Anomalies occurred in the performance
of three of the spacecraft systems which could have
jeopardized the success of the mission: an inverter
failure during powered flight, a leak in the oxygen
supply, and various malfunctions in the spacecraft
control system.
The faulty inverter, which resulted from vibra-
tion, was successfully switched out of the circuit
and the standby inverter was switched into the
circuit by an automatic device. If a pilot had
been present in the spacecraft, he could have com-
pleted this switching operation manually. If
neither the manual control nor an automatic switch-
over system had been present to perform this task
in a manned mission, the faulty inverter, which
powered the cooling fans, would have prompted a
mission abort.
The leak in the oxygen supply was found to have
resulted from a relaxation of spring force which
permitted partial opening of the emergency-rate con-
trol handle (see "Emer Flow", fig. 6). Since the
mission was planned for only one orbital pass, suf-
ficient oxygen was available at the leak rate in-
volved to sustain a pilot had one been present.
However, for a longer flight where the required
oxygen quantity might have approached the design
limit, the leak, if uncorrectable, could have re-
sulted in early termination of a manned flight. It
is believed that had a leak of this type been de-
tected either on the ground or by a pilot, an anal-
ysis of the problem would have resulted in the
recommendation to check the position of the emer-
gency-rate handle. Pressure exerted by the pilot
to close this handle would have satisfactorily
corrected the leakage problem.
The malfunctions in the control system for MA-it-
were those of the horizon scanner, wiring in the
amplifier-calibrator (Amp-Cal), and two 1-pound
thrusters. The malfunctions of the horizon scanner
included random error signals, which were sent to
the attitude gyros because of cold-cloud effects,
and a continuous ignore signal from the roll scanner
during most of the dark side of the orbit because of
a short circuit in the capacitor. Ignore signals
were employed to prevent improper slaving of the
gyros when the scanner became saturated with inci-
dent light. The random error signals were not
sufficiently serious to warrant discussion. The
opening of the circuit from th° pitch rate gyro to
the Amp-Cal was caused by a loose wire and resulted
in erratic spacecraft motion and excessive fuel vs-
age. The thruster-assembl. res occurred in the
1-pound roll-left and yaw-right thrust units, shown
in figure 8. Loss of these smaller thrusters
caused the spacecraft to exceed the normal attitude
limits in the automatic control mode, thereby activ-
ating the high-thrust units. Frequent actuation of
these larger thrusters resulted in a relatively
high fuel-usage rate. Adequate fuel was available
and the control system was sufficiently accurate to
complete the planned one-pass mission. However,
there was not enough fuel, based on the indicated
usage rate, to complete a three-pass orbital mis-
sion in the automatic control mode. Because of the
random nature of the attitude control errors, it
cannot be stated whether an attitude error about
any axis at retrograde for a three-pass mission
could have existed which would have compromised a
manned but automatic mission.
It is safe to assume that, if a pilot had been
present to exercise proper manual control, a three-
pass mission could have been successfully completed
within the attitude and fuel-usage constraints
normally imposed. During the orbital phase, the
pilot could have used either manual proportional or
fly-by-wire control to circumvent the errors intro-
duced by the scanners and the open gyro circuit.
During the MA-4 mission, an uprange deviation in
landing was partially caused by angular errors at
retrofire. With the use of manual proportional
control and with particular attention to accuracy
in yaw attitude, the pilot could have kept angular
deviations well within the required limits during
the retrofire period to effect a landing within the
designated landing area.
Mercury-Atlas Mission 5 (MA-5)
The MA-5 mission was unmanned, but included a
chimpanzee as the spacecraft occupant, and was
planned for three orbital passes about the earth.
The flight was terminated after two passes because
of a failure in the control system. Flight control
personnel on the ground wanted assurance that there
would be sufficient control fuel available for a
normal retrofire maneuver so that the spacecraft
could be recovered in a planned landing area.
Although there was a. recurrence of the cold-
cloud effects on the horizon scanners, the foremost
problem was the failure of the 1-pound roll-right
thruster. This failure caused the spacecraft to
cycle repeatedly to high thrust actuation about the
roll axis, which again resulted in a high rate of
fuel consumption. The electrical inverters also
approached their design upper limit in temperature,
but a failure of these units was not experienced.
As stated previously for the MA-4 mission, a
pilot using manual proportional or fly-by-wire con-
trol could have kept the spacecraft at the desired
attitude throughout the MA-5 flight with a near-
normal fuel consumption. A three-pass orbital
mission with a pilot present could therefore have
been completed successfully in the absence of
additional malfunctions.
Manned Orbital Missions
Mercury-Atlas Mission (MA-6)
The MA-6 mission, which was planned for three
orbital passes, was successfully completed as the
free world's first manned orbital flight. A faulty
limit switch in the circuit which normally indi-
cated release of the heat shield during landing-bag
deployment resulted in an uncertainty as to whether
the heat shield could prematurely part from the
spacecraft in orbit. This uncertainty prompted a
decision to retain the retropackage into reentry,
thereby maintaining the heat shield in place until
aerodynamic pressure could safely secure it. Other
inflight system anamolies included control system
thruster failures and an early deployment of the
drogue parachute. The thrusters which failed
during the MA-6 mission were the four 1-pound pitch
and yaw thrusters in the automatic RCS, shown in
figure 8.
Following the control system failures, the
MA-6 pilot controlled the spacecraft in the manual
proportional mode and completed the mission in a
satisfactory manner. Without the presence of the
pilot, the flight would have been terminated at an
earlier time, because, as in the MA-5 mission,
sufficient fuel would not have been available for a
three-pass mission in the automatic control mode.
Further discussion of the MA-6 pilot's ability to
control spacecraft attitudes manually is presented
in reference 6.
Although the early deployment of the drogue
parachute" did not affect the success of the MA-6
flight, more serious conditions could have resulted.
After exhaustive testing, the exact cause of the
anomoly remained undetermined. With a parachute
drogue deployment prior to the spacecraft's approx-
imately 70,000 feet in altitude during reentry, the
heating rate might have been sufficient to compro-
mise the structural integrity of the parachute. Be-
cause of this possibility, the automatic sequence,
as shown in figure 5, was changed for later missions
to include manual deployment of this parachute,
rather than deployment through the usual means of
sensing pressure altitude.
With regard to the faulty heat-shield instru-
mentation, the spacecraft would have reentered suc-
cessfully whether or not the retropackage had been
retained into the atmosphere. The action taken was
prompted by safety considerations in that the in-
strumentation could have been correct and the heat
shield released prior to reentry. If the heat
shield had been released from the spacecraft, and
if the pilot had not been able to override the
automatic sequence that jettisoned the retropackage
Cshown in fiK. 5), the heat shield would have un-
doubtedly parted from the spacecraft causing it to
burn catastrophically during reentry. In this case,
the action of the pilot would have been necessary
to preclude this occurrence.
Mercury-Atlas Mission 7 (MA-7)
The MA-7 mission was similar to the MA-6 flight
in that three orbital passes were planned and com-
pleted successfully. The only failure which oc-
curred that is pertinent to this discussion was a
malfunction of the pitch horizon scanner. This mal-
function, discussed in greater detail in refer-
ence 7, resulted in an excessive signal bias, which
was not constant in magnitude, in the output of the
scanner and caused large errors in pitch attitude
of the spacecraft while in the automatic mode.
As a result of a very ambitious flight plan,
the scanner malfunction did not become clearly
evident to the pilot and ground personnel until
late in the orbital phase of the mission. There-
fore, sufficient time was not available for a com-
plete analysis of the control problem, once it had
been discovered, and the pilot was faced with the
immediate task of controlling the spacecraft man-
ually during the critical retrofire period. Because
of the scanner malfunction, an additional complica-
tion arose which made the pilot's task more diffi-
cult. The attitude indicators on the astronaut's
instrument panel, shown in figure 9, were driven by
the output of the attitude gyros and were normally
used in precise manual control of the spacecraft.
The bias in the scanner, however, made the indica-
tion in pitch attitude erroneous and therefore
invalid as an attitude reference. The pilot was
then forced to cross-reference between his instru-
ments and the view through the window for attitude
indications. The bias in the pitch scanner effec-
tively placed the spacecraft at a negative pitch
angle which was greater than the intended attitude.
During the countdown for retrofire, the astronaut
once again checked to verify that the malfunction
in the ASCS was still present. During this check,
a large deviation in pitch attitude was recognized
by the pilot, and a sizeable excursion in yaw
attitude resulted when the pilot quickly attempted
to restore the pitch attitude to a proper value.
At the beginning of retrofire, the error in yaw
attitude was approximately 27°, as determined by
radar tracking. The pilot recognized this error
on the yaw indicator and corrected it before the
conclusion of the retrofire period. However, the
mean effective error in yaw was the primary reason
that the spacecraft landed about 250 nautical miles
downrange from the intended landing point. The
mean errors in pitch and roll attitude, which the
pilot corrected from a window reference, were effec-
tively zero. It should be stressed that yaw atti-
tude is the most difficult to aline from a window
reference, and since a good portion of the pilot's
time was spent using this attitude reference, the
lack of effectiveness in immediately correcting the
yaw error is understandable. For additional details
of the astronaut activities during the retrofire
period, consult reference 8.
In the spacecraft sequential system, circuitry
existed which determined whether or not the space-
craft attitudes were within certain prescribed
limits before the system would ignite the retro-
rockets automatically. This circuitry is presented
in figure 10. The functions of the attitude per-
mission relay driven by the ASCS, the attitude
permission bypass switch, and the manual retrofire
button should be noted. Because of the horizon
scanner malfunction, the spacecraft attitudes, as
indicated to this automatic circuitry, did not fall
within the so-called "attitude gates." In addition
to controlling spacecraft attitudes manually, the
astronaut was forced to bypass attitude permission
and ignite the retrorockets manually.
If the spacecraft had been unmanned but with
the sequential system still able to initiate retro-
rocket ignition, the attitudes at retrofire would
have been normal about all axes with the exception
of pitch. The scanner bias would have resulted in
the spacecraft's pitching down to approximately a
negative 5^° angle. In this condition, but in the
absence of other complications, the spacecraft
would have landed some 50 nautical miles downrange.
The initial conclusion from this statement might be
that the unmanned vehicle would have completed the
mission more effectively than the manned configur-
ation. However, because of the deviations in
scanner bias, it cannot be ascertained whether the
attitude constraints at retrofire would ever have
been satisfied. Therefore, the pilot was needed in
the spacecraft to initiate retrofire manually, a
procedure which, under these conditions, even the
ground personnel were unable to accomplish. That
is, a command from the ground was subject to the
same attitude constraints at retrofire as the auto-
matic system, whereas only the pilot could override
these constraints. He could also bypass the normal
30-second delay in the retrosequence circuitry, a
feature which would be important in a time-critical
situation. Conceivably, the attitudes resulting
from the bias could have permanently remained out-
side the attitude gates and the spacecraft would
have stayed in orbit until atmospheric drag would
eventually cause it to reenter in a matter of days.
The life support supplies and electrical power would
have been expended prior to this point, the heating
conditions during reentry would have been excessive,
and the spacecraft would not have landed in a
planned landing area.
Mercury-Atlas Mission 8 (MA-8)
In the MA-8 mission, six orbital passes about
the earth were completed as planned. There were
no failures which could have seriously affected
mission success with the spacecraft configured as
it was. One malfunction, a partial blockage of the
coolant control valve for the pressure-suit envi-
ronmental circuit, resulted in high suit tempera-
tures. This malfunction, analyzed more explicitly
in reference 9j was effectively corrected by the
pilot by precise adjustment of the faulty control
valve. The time history of the temperature rise
and the pilot's manipulation of the valve to correct
the problem are shown in figure 11. The location of
this valve in the ECS is shown schematically in
figure 6. It is believed, however, that if no means
had existed for controlling temperature, the mission
would have been terminated early because of the un-
comfortable temperature levels to which the pilot
would have been subjected. If the valve were con-
trollable only from the ground or automatically in
the spacecraft, the temperature level would undoubt-
edly have returned to normal. Nevertheless, the
presence of the pilot made possible the elimination
of these features, which represent considerable
weight and complexity. A detailed account of the
pilot's activities in controlling the ECS and other
spacecraft systems during the MA-8 flight is given
in reference 10.
Mercury-Atlas Mission 9 (MA-9)
The MA-9 mission, sometimes referred to as the
Mercury manned 1-day mission, was planned for up to
twenty-two orbital passes. The basic Mercury space-
craft was reconfigured and procedures were changed
to accommodate the increased mission duration.
Many of these new procedures took advantage of the
pilot's demonstrated ability to conserve spacecraft
consumables through manual control of various
systems. The first eighteen passes were conducted
essentially as planned; the pilot had followed his
flight plan closely and all planned major events
and attitude maneuvers were accomplished on sched-
ule. The mission appeared at this point to be
concluding successfully.
However, on the nineteenth orbital pass, the
pilot noted an indication that the 0.05g event,
which normally signals the beginning of reentry,
had occurred prematurely in orbit. If the indica-
tion were correct, the automatic control system had.
latched into its reentry mode of operation and
would not be available for the retrofire maneuver.
Subsequent to this anomaly, a sudden loss of a-c
power from both the main inverter and, after the
automatic switchover, from the standby inverter
disabled even the reentry control mode. The astro-
naut was therefore left with the task of control-
ling both the retrofire and reentry maneuvers by
using manual control modes. To complicate the
problem still further, the loss of a-c power also
caused the gyro-driven attitude indicators to be-
come nonfunctional. The pilot conducted the manual
control task with remarkable precision, landing
about U miles from the primary recovery ship. The
performance of the pilot as a result of the inflight
failure is analyzed in greater detail in refer-
ence 11. A postflight examination, discussed in
reference k, revealed that moisture in the logic
circuitry of the ASCS had caused electrical short
circuits, which in turn had prematurely closed a
relay in the 0.05g circuit. This closed relay
permitted the erroneous 0.05g indication and shifted
the ASCS to its reentry logic. Soon thereafter,
the a-c power supply became overloaded because of
the short circuits and was automatically shut down.
The relationship of the electrical power system to
the automatic control circuit is shown in figure 12,
with points labelled as "s" indicating the locations
of electrical short circuits.
Had the spacecraft not been designed to allow
exercising the required manual override commands,
the vehicle would never have assumed the proper
attitude for retrofire, and the sequential system
would therefore have failed to initiate this event
for reasons stated in the previous discussion of
MA-7 mission. Without retrofire, the same situa-
tion also previously mentioned would have existed.
That is, the spacecraft would have remained in
orbit until atmospheric drag initiated reentry
about 2 or J days later and after life support
consumables had been expended.
Summary of Mercury Pilot's Role
For the two unmanned missions, MA-^ and MA-5,
control system difficulties made impossible the
successful completion of a three-pass orbital
flight, which was the design mission for the
Mercury spacecraft. But in both cases, the pres-
ence of a pilot and the capability to control the
spacecraft attitudes manually would have made the
three-pass mission possible. This fact was demon-
strated in the MA-6 mission in which a similar mal-
function occurred but in which the astronaut com-
pleted the flight by using his manual control modes.
A summary of the pilot's role in circumventing
Mercury systems failures is presented in table III.
Although not previously discussed, the MA-7 and
MA-8 flights also demonstrated the feasibility of
operating in an attitude-free drifting flight mode,
which was an effective means of conserving control
fuel and electrical power. This experience made it
possible to plan long periods of drifting flight
for the MA-9 mission and thereby accomplish the
extended mission without prohibitive systems design
changes.
For the MA.-6 mission, it was pointed out that,
without the pilot, the flight would undoubtedly
have been terminated before the planned time be-
cause of an excessive rate of fuel consumption in
the automatic control mode. In the successful
MA-7 flight, manual initiation of the retrorocket-
ignition sequence prevented the horizon scanner
malfunction from significantly delaying this crit-
ical event. Although an error in yaw angle caused
the spacecraft to land somewhat beyond the planned
landing area, this error would have undoubtedly
been much greater had the pilot not been present.
The six-pass MA-8 mission was successful, although
a problem of an abnormal increase in suit temper-
ature could have terminated the flight early had
no means been available for reducing this temper-
ature. The pilot, however, was able to correct
this situation by manual adjustment of his coolant
flow valve. Short circuits in the automatic control
circuitry during the MA-9 flight made it essential
for the pilot to control the spacecraft manually
during retrofire and reentry.
Since the comprehensive preflight preparation
for each of the Mercury astronauts was a major
factor in their ability to analyze and correct in-
flight problems, the reader is directed to refer-
ence 12 for a summary of the Mercury pilot training
program.
Concluding Remarks
Although the Mercury spacecraft was designed
for completely automatic or remote control of all
normal mission events, a careful analysis of the
types of failures which have occurred in the
Mercury orbital flights clearly indicates the im-
portance of the pilot's role. This role involves
his decision capability, his ability to actuate
system controls and initiate flight sequences man-
ually, and his irreplaceable capacity to recognize,
accept, analyze, and act upon the unpredictable
events which nearly always occur. As in Mercury,
the effectiveness of preflight training is a key
factor in the proficiency with which the space
pilot assumes this role.
Man's versatility and judgment will always be
an inherent factor when considering the human pilot
as an integral part of the operating systems for
space vehicles. One of the first-order objectives
of the MA-9 mission was "... to verify that man can
function as a primary operating system of the space-
craft. " This objective was, of course, achieved by
Astronaut Cooper when he successfully completed the
planned mission and safely returned the spacecraft
despite a disabled control system. As a result of
Mercury experience, many of the systems in the
Gemini and Apollo manned spacecraft have been de-
signed with manual control as the primary or sole
mode of operation. If it were possible to design
an automatic system which would duplicate man's
role as a spacecraft commander, the added burden
in weight and complexity under our present state of
technology would clearly preclude the practicality,
if not the possibility, of complete automation in
exploratory research spacecraft.
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TABLE I. - ORBITAL FLIGHT PROGRAM SCHEDULE
Unmanned
MA-**- (Sept. 15)
MA-5 (Nov. 29)
Manned
MA -6 (Feb. 20)
MA-7 (May 2k]
MA-8 (Oct. 3)
MA-9 (May 15)
1961
A
1
1962
A
1
1
1963
A
TABLE II.- OPERATING MODES OF ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEM
Primary modes
Automatic stabilization
and control system (ASCS)
Fly-by-wire (FEW)
Rate stabilization
and control system (RSCS)
Manual proportional (MP)
Secondary modes of
primary mode
Orbit
Orientation
Reentry
Auxiliary damping
High and low thrust
Q
Low thrust only
Reaction control
system (RCS) used
Automatic
RCS
Automatic RCS
Manuald RCS
Manual RCS
Type of
T • i aLinkage
Automatic,
electrical
Manual ,
electrical
Automatic
and manual .
electrical
Manual ,
mechanical
alncludes mode of initiating control and physical means of achieving control.
So named because supplied fuel for automatic control mode.
°For MA-8 and MA-9 only.
So named because supplied fuel for manual proportional mode.
eRates could be initiated about any axis through hand controller and maintained
at the desired rate automatically by this primary control mode.
TABLE III.- SUMMARY OF MERCURY PILOT'S ROLE
Mission
MA-4a
MA-5a
MA-6
MA-?
MA-8
MA-9
Number of
orbital passes
planned
1
3
3
3
6
22
Number of
passes
completed
1
2
3
3
6
22
Mission
critical
malfunctions
Inverter
Control thruster
Control system
Control thrusters
Retropack
instrumentation
Horizon scanner
Excessive suit
temperature
Electrical short
circuit
Pilot action necessary
Manual switchover to redundant unit if auto
switch failed
Manual attitude control to prevent early fuel
depletion
Manual attitude control to prevent early fuel
depletion and maintain accuracy in pitch
Manual attitude control used to prevent early
fuel depletion
Manual override of normal retropack jettison
needed to delay heat shield separation if
instrumentation had been correct
Bypass of attitude permission during retrofire
and manual rocket ignition to permit timely
reentry
Manual control of suit temperature necessary
to continue manned flight
Manual ignition of rockets and manual atti-
tude control during retrofire and reentry
These two unmanned missions are discussed from the standpoint of the expected response of a
pilot had one been present.
Spacecraft could not have completed design mission
usage rate.
of three orbital passes at indicated fuel
Astronauts
couch
Communications / Barter
systems
Electrical and
sequential
equipment Escape
rocket
motor
Escape tower
Parachutes
Instrument panel
Control system
' Environmenta
control system
'Retrorocket motor
Posigrada
motor
Heat shield
Figure 1.- Mercury spacecraft systems.
ili
• 55
inil
A3
i
£ •Ji
4
;[
1 5
x •
1
Pitch-control l inkage
Yaw-control linkoo* Roll-control linkog*
Figure U.- Three-axis hand _
PilM cUlo, 30...C d.lo, I
JR««ntry tic bi I iiotion(0.05g «y»nt)) ^_ Rot* domp ft. roll rot« Pilot twitch
Deploy main parochul*
An, j^rfio twitch
Turn »n li^ il, HF k.JCQ. l«l°y | | 10-mm J.loy |
•"••_ | T «,.
• tlantiol «Uctronici
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Figure 6.- Environmental control system.
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